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The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly
the most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experi-
ments have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to ﬁnd support
for it. By contrast, the experiments ﬁnd that simultaneous-move outcomes are
modal and that behavior in endogenous timing games is quite heterogeneous.
This paper generalizes Saloner’s (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) en-
dogenous timing games by assuming that players are averse to inequality in
payoﬀs. We explore the theoretical implications of inequity aversion and com-
pare them to the empirical evidence. We ﬁnd that this explanation is able to
organize most of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games. How-
ever, inequity aversion is not able to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s
endogenous timing games.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
The theoretical literature on endogenous timing started with Saloner (1987),
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), and Robson (1990). This literature tries to iden-
tify factors that might lead to the endogenous emergence of sequential or simul-
taneous play in oligopolistic markets.
Saloner (1987) analyzes a duopoly with two periods where ﬁrms can produce
in both periods before the market clears. In the ﬁrst period ﬁrms simultaneously
choose initial production levels. The choices of the ﬁrst period are observed and
then additional non-negative second period outputs are chosen simultaneously.
Saloner shows that if production costs are the same across both periods, then
there is a continuum of equilibria: any point on the outer envelope of the reaction
functions between the ﬁrm’s Stackelberg outputs is attainable with a subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE). Additionally, in all of these equilibria pro-
duction takes place only in the ﬁrst period. However, Ellingsen (1995) shows
that only the two Stackelberg equilibria in Saloner’s game survive elimination
of weakly dominated strategies.1
In Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s action commitment game, two ﬁrms must
decide a quantity to be produced in one of two periods before the market clears.
If a ﬁrm commits to a quantity in the ﬁrst period, it acts as the leader but it
does not know whether the other ﬁrm has chosen to commit early or not. If a
ﬁrm commits to a quantity in the second period, then it observes the ﬁrst period
production of the opponent (or its decision to wait). Hamilton and Slutsky show
that this game has three SPNE: both ﬁrms committing in the ﬁrst period to
the simultaneous-move Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantities, and each waiting
and the other playing its Stackelberg leader quantity in the ﬁrst period. They
also show that only the Stackelberg equilibria survive elimination of weakly
dominated strategies.2
Observed behavior in experiments on these two canonical models of endoge-
nous timing is at odds with the theory. For example, Huck et al. (2002)
test experimentally the predictions of Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’s action
commitment game. They ﬁnd that: (i) Stackelberg outcomes are rare, (ii)
simultaneous-move Cournot outcomes are modal, (iii) simultaneous-move out-
comes are often played in the second production period, and (iv) behavior is
quite heterogeneous—in some cases followers punish leaders, in other cases col-
lusive outcomes are played, and in other cases Stackelberg warfare is observed.3
Müller (2006) tests the predictions of Saloner’s game extended by Ellingson. He
ﬁnds that: (i) Stackelberg outcomes are extremely rare, (ii) simultaneous-move
1Several papers have suggested ways to reduce the set of equilibria in Saloner’s model
by modifying the structure of the game. For example, Robson (1990) introduces discount-
ing between periods, Pal (1991) introduces cost asymmetries between periods, Maggi (1996)
introduces uncertainty about demand.
2A model where the price is chosen was considered by Robson (1990), and a Stackelberg
outcome is also obtained.
3Throughout the paper we consider that collusive outcomes describe situations where both
ﬁrms produce less than their Cournot-Nash quantities. We also consider that Stackelberg
warfare describes a situation where both ﬁrms produce more than their Cournot-Nash outputs.
2symmetric outcomes are the most frequent outcomes, (iii) sometimes collusive
outcomes are observed, (iv) there is production in both periods with 84% of
production taking place in the ﬁrst period, (v) subjects seem to attempt to bal-
ance market shares in the second production period, and (vi) subjects do not
produce more than the Stackelberg follower’s quantity in the ﬁrst production
period.4
The questions that the endogenous timing literature tries to address are par-
ticularly relevant in terms of new markets, where two or more ﬁrms will enter.
The experimental evidence suggests that simultaneous-move play may a better
predictor of behavior in markets for new goods than sequential play.5 It also
suggests that there may be substantial heterogeneity in behavior in these mar-
kets. In some cases collusive outcomes may emerge, in other cases Stackelberg
warfare, and in others still sequential play with Stackelberg like outcomes.6
Why does the theory perform poorly in the experiments? One possibility
is that subjects are not able to iteratively rule out dominated strategies and
stop after one or two rounds of reasoning. There is substantial experimental
evidence that supports this view. Even if subjects are able to do eliminate dom-
inated strategies the two Stackelberg equilibria involve large payoﬀ diﬀerences
and this creates a coordination problem. This implies that playing the Stack-
elberg leader’s quantity is risky by comparison with playing the Cournot-Nash
quantity.7
It is possible to think of explanations for some aspects of the empirical
evidence. However, it is much harder to explain all of the experimental ﬁnd-
ings. For example, the risk-payoﬀ equilibrium selection argument may explain
why simultaneous-move outcomes are more frequently played than Stackelberg
outcomes. However, it cannot explain the emergence of collusive outcomes or
Stackelberg warfare. It is also not clear how this explanation can account for
the fact that simultaneous-move play can take place in the second production
period in Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game.
The gap between the theory and the experimental evidence is the main mo-
tivation behind this paper. To bridge this gap the paper assumes that players
in endogenous timing games have social preferences. The paper derives the
predictions of this explanation for both Saloner’s and Hamilton and Slutsky’s
endogenous timing games and compares the predictions to the empirical evi-
dence.
Social preferences have been shown to explain a broad range of data for
many diﬀerent games. The clearest evidence for these type of preferences comes
from bargaining and trust games. For example, in ultimatum games oﬀers are
usually much more generous than predicted by equilibrium and low oﬀers are
4Section 2 discusses the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games.
5As we have seen the prediction of Stackelberg equilibria rests on equilibrium selection
argumens. Simultaneous-move Cournot-Nash equilibria typically exist, however, they do not
survive the application of equilibrium reﬁnements.
6Bagwell (1995) points out that the theoretical prediction of Stackelberg outcomes cru-
cially depends on the perfect observability of the Stackelberg leader’s action. However, the
experiments assume perfect observability which rules out this explanation.
7See Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) for a discussion of risk-payoﬀ dominance considerations.
3often rejected. According to the social preferences explanation, these oﬀers are
consistent with an equilibrium in which players make oﬀers knowing that other
players may reject allocations that appear unfair. Huck et al. (2002), Müller
(2006), and Fonseca et al. (2005b) suggest that inequity aversion may also
explain behavior in endogenous timing games. However, these papers do not
formalize this explanation.
The paper starts by generalizing Saloner’s (1987) game and Hamilton and
Slutsky’s (1990) action commitment game by assuming that players are averse
to inequality in payoﬀs. To incorporate inequity aversion in endogenous timing
games we make use of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) approach. That is, we as-
sume that an inequity averse player dislikes advantageous inequity—i.e. it feels
compassion towards the opponent if the opponent has lower proﬁts—and also
dislikes disadvantageous inequity—i.e. it feels envy towards the opponent if the
opponent has higher proﬁts.
The paper shows that relatively high levels of inequity aversion rule out
asymmetric equilibria in both Saloner’s game as well as in Hamilton and Slut-
sky’s action commitment game. In other words, relatively high levels of inequity
aversion favor simultaneous-move play over sequential play. The intuition for
this result is straightforward. For relatively high levels of inequity aversion,
playing leader type outcomes leads to inequity costs which are larger than the
material beneﬁts of leadership.8
The paper also shows that inequity aversion gives rise to a continuum of
symmetric equilibria in both Saloner’s game as well as in Hamilton and Slutsky’s
action commitment game. The intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose
that a player knows that his opponent will produce the Cournot-Nash quantity.
If this player is averse to inequity, then his best response is to produce also the
Cournot-Nash quantity. Producing an output diﬀerent from the Cournot-Nash
quantity reduces the player’s material payoﬀ and increases inequity costs. Now,
suppose that a player knows that his opponent will produce somewhat less than
the Cournot-Nash quantity. If this player is averse to advantageous inequity,
then his best response is to produce exactly the same quantity as the opponent.
Producing a higher quantity than the opponent increases the player’s material
payoﬀ by less than the cost from advantageous inequity. Similarly, if a player
knows that his opponent will produce somewhat more than the Cournot-Nash
quantity, then his best response is also to produce the same quantity as the
opponent. Producing a lower quantity than the opponent increases the player’s
material payoﬀ by less than the cost from disadvantageous inequity.
The previous paragraph shows us that inequity aversion may lead both play-
ers to produce less than the Cournot-Nash quantity. This happens whenever
players have a relatively high level of compassion and are able to coordinate
on a “collusive outcome.” Similarly, inequity aversion may lead both players to
produce more than the Cournot-Nash quantity. This happens whenever play-
ers have a relatively high level of envy and are unable to coordinate on the
8Relatively low levels of inequity aversion do not rule out asymmetric equilibria. In fact, as
inequity aversion vanishes the set equilibria of each game converges to the set of equilibria of
the respective standard game where players are assumed to care only about material payoﬀs.
4Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Thus, if a population is composed of players with
heterogeneous social preferences and these individuals are matched in pairs to
play endogenous timing games, then heterogeneity in behavior is to be expected.
It turns out that inequity aversion is able to explain most of the experi-
mental evidence on Saloner’s game. As we have seen, inequity aversion can
rule out asymmetric equilibria and generates a continuum of simultaneous-move
symmetric equilibria. Inequity aversion can also explain the fact that subjects
produce in both periods. This happens because inequity aversion gives rise to
a multiplicity of symmetric equilibria in the game and subjects have to coordi-
nate on one of them. If subjects are unable to coordinate in one of the multiple
symmetric equilibria in the ﬁrst production period, then they have an incentive
to produce in the second production period to attain coordination before the
market clears. The lack of coordination on a symmetric outcome in the ﬁrst
period also explains why players act as if they wish to balance market shares in
the second production period.
Inequity aversion is also able to explain most experimental ﬁndings on Hamil-
ton and Slutsky’s action commitment game. Inequity aversion can rule out se-
quential play and gives rise to a continuum of simultaneous-move symmetric
outcomes.9 Heterogeneity in social preferences across players can explain the
diversity of behavior in Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game. As
we have seen inequity aversion may lead to collusive outcomes and can also
generate Stackelberg warfare. Additionally, inequity aversion also explains why
followers seem to punish leaders. If inequity aversion is relatively low and there
is sequential play, then the leader will feel compassion towards the follower and
the follower will feel envious of the leader. A compassionate leader will produce
less than a selﬁsh leader and an envious follower will produce more than a selﬁsh
follower. This is exactly what the data shows in Huck et al.’s (2002) experiment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the ev-
idence. Section 3 describes Saloner’s (1987) and Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990)
models and their results. Section 4 extends the models by assuming that play-
ers can be averse to inequity and studies the consequences of this assumption.
Section 5 summarizes the predictions of the inequity aversion explanation and
compares them to the empirical evidence. Section 6 concludes the paper. Proofs
of Propositions are in the Appendix.
2 Experimental Evidence
Müller (2006) tests the predictions of Saloner’s game extended by Ellingson.
In the experiment, ﬁxed pairs of subjects are repeatedly matched to play the
game. Upon entering a lab 40 subjects were assigned to a computer and received
9Like in Saloner’s game with inequity averse plyers, among all the symmetric equilibria in
Hamilton and Slutsky’s game with inequity averse players, the Cournot-Nash equilibirum may
be the one that is more fequently played. This happens because this equilibrium is always a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game no matter if there is inequity aversion or not.
That is not the case with the other symmetric equilibria.
5written instructions. Subjects could choose quantities from a ﬁnite grid between
0 and 100 with .01 as the smallest step. There were two treatments. Treatment
“ONE” was a standard one-period Cournot duopoly. Treatment “TWO” was
the two-period duopoly game by Saloner. For each treatment 10 markets were
conducted. Subjects had all the information about costs and demand and had
ap r o ﬁt calculator to try out the consequences of their choices.
For each market there were 25 rounds. After each round was completed
subjects were informed about their own quantities and their proﬁts and the
quantities of the opponent. The total earnings of each subject were determined
by the sum of earnings per round. The earnings of each round were measured
in ECU and were determined as the diﬀerence between the market price, given
by the linear inverse demand function P = 100 − (qi + qj), and marginal cost,
equal to 1, times total quantity produced, qi.10
It is straightforward to show that in the standard Cournot game with only
one production period a unique Nash equilibrium exists and the Cournot-Nash
quantity is given by N =3 3 . The Stackelberg leader’s quantity is given by
S =4 9 .50 and the Stackelberg follower’s quantity by R(S)=2 4 .75.T h e
collusive outcome is given by
¡
C1,C2¢
=( 2 4 .75,24.75). Table I—taken from
Müller (2006)—displays average individual quantities in the two production pe-
riods along with total individual quantities in both periods again for blocks of
rounds separately.
Table I
1st bloc 2nd bloc 3rd bloc last rd. all rds.
rds. 1-8 rds. 9-16 rds. 17-24 rd. 25
1st period 26.27 25.71 24.86 26.90 25.66
(52.54) (51.41) (49.71) (53.80) (51.32)
2nd period 6.31 4.76 4.91 6.30 5.37
(12.63) (9.51) (9.82) (12.60) (10.73)
Both periods 32.58 30.46 29.77 33.20 31.03
(65.16) (60.93) (59.54) (66.40) (62.06)
Individual quantities in treatment TWO
Total quantities in parentheses
We see from Table I that a subject produces on average a quantity of 25.66
in the ﬁrst period. This quantity is very close to the Stackelberg follower’s quan-
tity or the collusive quantity of 24.75. We also see that, on average, a subject
produces a quantity of 5.37 in the second production period. Thus, there is pro-
d u c t i o ni nb o t hp e r i o d sw i t ht h eb u l ko f production—namely 83%—taking place
in the ﬁrst production period. We also see that total output is decreasing with
experience. This may happen because experience increases collusive outcomes.
10At the start of the experiment subjects received a one-time endowment of 500 ECU. At
the end of the experiment the sum of earnings per round was converted into DM with 900
ECU =1 DM.
6To have a better picture of behavior let us now consider disaggregate data
for each of the 10 markets. Table II—taken from Müller (2006)—displays average
individual quantities as observed in rounds 17 to 24 in each individual market
(ordered according to increasing total output).
Table II





2 q1 q2 Q
1 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 50.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
2 25.00 25.00 0.00 0.00 25.00 25.00 50.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
3 25.00 25.00 2.38 1.00 27.38 26.00 53.38
(0.00) (0.00) (3.89) (0.00) (3.89) (0.00) (3.89)
4 16.13 18.75 13.13 6.25 29.25 25.00 54.25
(10.56) (5.18) (13.74) (5.18) (7.44) (0.00) (7.44)
5 20.00 21.00 9.25 4.88 29.25 25.88 55.13
(0.00) (2.88) (3.81) (2.70) (3.81) (2.10) (4.61)
6 26.25 23.38 3.50 9.00 29.75 32.38 62.13
(5.55) (8.23) (4.93) (8.11) (2.76) (0.92) (3.52)
7 20.00 30.00 10.00 5.00 30.00 35.00 65.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
8 28.00 30.00 7.38 2.50 35.38 32.50 67.88
(3.16) (8.45) (4.14) (3.78) (4.50) (5.98) (9.69)
9 33.13 34.63 0.00 0.50 33.13 35.13 68.25
(0.64) (0.74) (0.00) (0.93) (0.64) (0.83) (1.04)
10 22.88 23.00 12.25 11.25 35.13 34.25 69.38
(12.81) (4.54) (11.17) (4.17) (2.23) (2.19) (3.16)
Average quantities in each market in rounds 17-24
Standard deviations in parentheses
Inspection of the last three columns in Table II reveals that, on average,
roughly equal market shares are obtained and that there are almost no outcomes
that resemble Stackelberg market shares. We also see that markets 1 to 5 display
collusive behavior and markets 6 to 10 display Cournot-Nash behavior in the
last third of the experiment.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table II show that the average (across 8 rounds) ﬁrst
period quantities produced in the 10 markets are smaller than or equal to the
Stackelberg follower’s quantity in 14 out of 20 cases, are between the Stack-
elberg follower’s quantity and the Cournot-Nash quantity in 5 out of 20 cases,
and are greater than the Cournot-Nash quantity (but not signiﬁcantly) in only 1
out of 20 cases. Thus, in most cases subjects produce up to the Stackelberg fol-
lower’s quantity (which is equal to the collusive quantity) in the ﬁrst production
period.11
11This pattern of behavior is present accross all rounds as we can see in the ﬁrst row of
7Columns 4 and 5 in Table II show that ﬁrms do not produce an incremental
amount in the second period so that total production is equal to the Cournot-
Nash quantities. Also, subjects seem to attempt to balance market shares in the
second production period. Subjects who produced more in the ﬁrst production
period produce less in the second production period than subjects who produced
more in the ﬁrst production period. We also see that overproduction, that
is, producing outside the outer envelope of the reaction functions, is rarely
observed.
Huck et al. (2002) test experimentally the predictions of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990)’s action commitment game. In the experiment they use the
linear inverse demand function
P(q1 + q2)=m a x
©
30 − (q1 + q2),0
ª
,
and they assume that costs of production are linear and given by Ci(qi)=
6qi,i=1 ,2. A c c o r d i n gt ot h i ss p e c i ﬁcation, the predictions of Hamilton and
Slutsky (1990) are as follows. The Stackelberg leader produces in period one
the quantity S =1 2and the Stackelberg follower produces in period two the
quantity R(S)=6 . The simultaneous-move Cournot-Nash quantities are played
in period one and are given by
¡
N1,N2¢
=( 8 ,8). The collusive quantities are
(C1,C2)=( 6 ,6). Huck et al. (2002) run an experiment with a large payoﬀ
matrix where subjects could pick an integer quantity from 3 to 15 units. They
a l s or u na ne x p e r i m e n tw i t has m a l lp a y o ﬀ matrix where subjects could select
a quantity from the set {6,8,12}. Table III—taken from Huck et al. (2002)—
displays the experimental results on an aggregate level for both the large and
the small payoﬀ matrices.
Table III
Explicit Both ﬁrms
In period 1 followers in period 2 Total
Large payoﬀ matrix
Average quantity 9.15 8.93 8.40 17.70
Standard deviation 1.91 1.75 1.67 1.93
Number of observations 543 207 140 890
Small payoﬀ matrix
Average quantity 8.65 7.89 7.60 16.05
Standard deviation 2.24 1.22 1.21 1.64
Number of observations 136 94 170 400
Table III shows us that, in the experiment with the large payoﬀ matrix, in
543 out of 890 cases (61%) subjects committed themselves in period 1. In the
remaining cases subjects decided to wait. Those who decided to produce in the
ﬁrst period produce on average 9.15 units, which is less than the Stackelberg
leader’s quantity of 12 units. Those who decided to wait and produce in the
Table I.
8second period after having observed that the opponent produced in the ﬁrst
period produce an average output of 8.93 units which is larger than the Stackel-
berg follower’s output of 6 units. This seems to imply that Stackelberg followers
exhibit aversion to disadvantageous inequity since they are willing to produce
more than the material best response to reduce the payoﬀ of the Stackelberg
leader. When both subjects decided to wait, 140 out of 890 cases (18%), their
average output is 8.40 units, which is similar to the Cournot-Nash quantity.
Table III also shows us that, in the experiment with the small payoﬀ matrix,
only in 136 out of 400 cases (34%) did subjects commit themselves in the ﬁrst
period. Both subjects decided to wait in 170 out of 400 cases (42%). Average
outputs are slightly smaller than those observed with the large payoﬀ matrix.
Huck et al. (2002) also ﬁnd that explicit followers observed responses in the
experiment with the large payoﬀ matrix have a curious pattern. The continuous
theoretical best reply function is given by qF =1 2− 0.5qL. On average, the
observed responses of followers have a negative slope when the leaders produce
less than 7 units or more than 12 units. However, when leaders produces between
7 and 12 units the responses of followers have a positive slope.12 Table IV
summarizes market outcomes in terms of absolute and relative frequencies for
the experiment with the large payoﬀ matrix.
Table IV
Number Number of cases
Market outcome Type of cases incl. quant. 9 and 11
Cournot Equilibrium 64 14.4% 93 20.9%
Stackelberg Equilibrium 24 5.4% 33 7.4%
Stackelberg/Cournot Coord. failure 27 6.1% 41 9.2%
Stackelberg warfare Coord. failure 21 4.7% 30 6.7%
Stackelberg punished Other 43 9.7% 55 12.4%
Collusion (successful) Other 25 5.6% 25 5.6%
Collusion (exploited) Other 19 4.3% 19 4.3%
Collusion (failed) Coord. failure 34 7.6% 41 9.2%
Others 188 42.2% 108 24.3%
Sum 445 100% 445 100%
We see from Table IV that the Cournot equilibrium is the most frequent
outcome since it represents 14.4% of all outcomes—20.9% of all outcomes when
the quantity 9 is counted as a Cournot action. The Stackelberg equilibria oc-
cur only rarely since they represent 5.4% of all outcomes—7.4% of all outcomes
when the quantity 11 is counted as a Stackelberg leader action. Coordination
failure occurs in 10.8% of all outcomes—15.9% when 9 is counted as Cournot
and 11 as Stackelberg leader actions. In the experiment with the small pay-
oﬀ matrix Cournot outcomes become much more frequent (45% vs. 20.9%).
12See Fig. 2 in Huck et al. (2002). This ﬁnding is replicated in Huck et al. (2001) in a
game where the roles of leader and follower are exogenously assigned.
9The frequencies of successful and unsuccessful collusion are similar than the
ones with the large payoﬀ matrix. Coordination failure becomes less important
(4.5% vs. 15.9%). Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria occur even less frequently
(5% vs. 7.4%) than with the large matrix. The results with the small payoﬀ
matrix rule out the possibility that complexity was responsible for the results
obtained with the large payoﬀ matrix. Thus, the results with the small payoﬀ
matrix reinforce the idea that subjects prefer symmetric Cournot outcomes to
asymmetric outcomes.
Fonseca et al. (2005a) show that Huck et al. (2002)’s ﬁndings are robust to
cost asymmetries.13 They ﬁnd that low cost ﬁrms are not able to use their cost
advantage to become Stackelberg leaders and that Cournot play is modal.14
Fonseca et al. (2005b) test experimentally Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’ s
observable delay game. In this game two ﬁrms bindingly announce a production
period (one out of two periods) and then produce in the announced sequence.
Hamilton and Slutsky show that this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium
where ﬁrms produce only in the ﬁrst period. Fonseca et al. (2005b) ﬁnd that
there is delay in players’ production decisions.
3 The Model
Following Saloner (1987), consider a symmetric duopoly with two production
periods, where the market clears at the end of the second period. In the ﬁrst
production period, ﬁrms 1 and 2 simultaneously produce outputs q1
1 and q2
1,
respectively. These outputs become common knowledge and, in the second
production period, the ﬁrms simultaneously produce nonnegative outputs q1
2
and q2





2). The ﬁrms choose outputs to maximize
expected proﬁts. The ﬁrms have the same constant marginal cost of production
each period, c>0.
For ﬁrm i,d e ﬁne the single-period reaction function15







qi,i 6= j =1 ,2.
We assume that these reaction functions are well behaved.16 Let
¡
N1,N2¢
be the unique single-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium outcome. When ﬁrm i
produces qi in the ﬁrst period and ﬁrm j produces its best response in the second
13We are not aware of any experiment with Saloner’s game that allows for cost asymmetries.
14Van Damme and Hurkens (1999, 2004) analyze a timing game with cost diﬀerences be-
tween ﬁrms. In their models a unique Stackelberg equilibrium is selected with the most
eﬃcient ﬁrm being the Stackelberg leader.
15The reaction function corrresponding to a standard single production period Cournot
model.
16By this we mean, −1 ≤ ∂Ri(qj)/∂qi < 0. The second condition ensures the existence
of a unique single-period Cournot-Nash equilibrium. A set of suﬃcient conditions for Ri
functions to be “well-behaved” is that P(qi +qj) is strictly positive on some bounded interval
(0, ¯ Q) on which it is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, strictly decreasing, and concave, with
P(qi + qj)=0for qi + qj ≥ ¯ Q.










qi,i 6= j =1 ,2.
For simplicity, we assume that only one Stackelberg point exists for each ﬁrm.
Denote these points by Si,i=1 ,2, with








qi,i 6= j =1 ,2.
Denote the outer envelope of the ﬁrms’ reaction functions, R1 and R2, by R,







∈ R, q1 ≤ S1, and q2 ≤ S2ª
.
Saloner (1987) shows that the following strategies for each ﬁrm constitute a
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
qi
1 = ai, where
¡
a1,a 2¢












































the outer envelope of the reaction functions between (and including) the ﬁrms’
Stackelberg outputs is attainable with a SPNE. Furthermore, it also tells us
that all production takes place in the ﬁrst production period. The intuition
behind this result is as follows. Let
¡
¯ a1,¯ a2¢




be on R2(q1). That is, at
¡
¯ a1,¯ a2¢
ﬁrm 1’s total output
is more than it’s single-period Cournot output and ﬁrm 2’s total output equal




















is not an equilibrium of the single-period Cournot game
since when ﬁrm 2 produces ¯ a2, ﬁrm 1 would do better to produce less than ¯ a1.
However, in Saloner’s game, ﬁrm 1 cannot gain by producing less than ¯ a1 in the
ﬁrst production period, say by choosing q1
1 < ¯ a1. If it does, then ﬁrm 2 would
produce an additional amount in the second period, q2
2 = R2(q1
1) − ¯ a2 > 0, and




Ellingsen (1995) shows that the two Stackelberg equilibria are the only sub-
game perfect equilibrium outcomes which survive the elimination of weakly dom-
inated strategies. This happens because producing in the ﬁrst period is weakly
dominated by waiting: if ﬁrm 1 is uncertain about which strategy ﬁrm 2 is go-
i n gt op l a y ,ﬁrm 1’s best strategy is to wait, in which case it is able to make a
best response to any quantity that ﬁrm 2 chooses. But, then this implies that
11ﬁrm 2 would choose the Stackelberg leadership quantity. Elimination of weakly
dominated strategies also implies that in the Stackelberg equilibria the leader
produces only in the ﬁrst production period and the follower may produce only
in the second period.
In Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) action commitment game ﬁrms can only
produce in one of two production periods. In the ﬁrst period ﬁrms can either
produce some quantity or decide to wait. If, and only if, a ﬁrm decides to
wait it is informed about the opponent’s ﬁrst period action and after that can
choose it’s second-period production. Hamilton and Slutsky show that this game
has three subgame perfect Nash equilibria. One simultaneous-move Cournot
equilibrium where both ﬁrms produce the Cournot-Nash quantities in the ﬁrst
production period.17 Two sequential-move Stackelberg equilibria where one ﬁrm
produces the Stackelberg leader’s quantity in the ﬁrst production period and the
other ﬁrm produces the Stackelberg follower’s quantity in the second production


























The Stackelberg equilibria are in undominated strategies. The simultaneous-
move equilibrium uses weakly dominated strategies since playing the Cournot-
Nash quantity in the ﬁrst production period is dominated by waiting to play
after one’s rival.
4 Inequity Aversion
Many experiments indicate that individuals are not only motivated by material
self-interest, but also care about the well-being of others. We incorporate this
possibility in Saloner’s game by assuming that ﬁrms are averse to inequality in
proﬁts. To model this, we make use of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) approach.











,i 6= j =1 ,2.
T h et e r m si nt h es q u a r eb r a c k e ta r et h ep a y o ﬀ eﬀects of disadvantageous and
advantageous inequity, respectively. When πj > πi ﬁrm i feels envy of ﬁrm j,
this is the disadvantageous inequity term. When πj < πi ﬁrm i feels compassion
for ﬁrm j, this is the advantageous inequity term. Fehr and Schmidt assume that
αi and βi are nonnegative, that αi > βi, that is, the dislike of disadvantageous
17Both ﬁrms producing the Cournot-Nash quantities in the second production period is
not an equilibrium since each ﬁrm would do better by unilaterally deviate and produce the
Stackelberg leader’s quantity in the ﬁrst production period.
18A ﬁrm producing the Stackelberg leader’s quantity, Si, in the ﬁrst production period and
the opponent producing the Stackelberg follower’s quantity, Rj(Si), in the ﬁrst production
period is not an equilibrium because the leader would rather produce it’s best response to the
Stackelberg follower’s quantity, that is Ri(Rj(Si)).
12inequity is stronger than that of advantageous inequity, and that βi is smaller
than 1. We assume that αi is nonnegative and that βi ∈ [0,1/2].19
Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that the single-period reaction function of ﬁrm i,





si(qj), 0 ≤ qj ≤ q(βi)
qj,q (βi) ≤ qj ≤ q(αi)
ti(qj),q (αi) ≤ qj
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q(βi) is the solution to
(1 − βi)[P(2q) − ci]+P0(2q)q =0 , (4)
and q(αi) is the solution to
(1 + αi)[P(2q) − ci]+P0(2q)q =0 . (5)
The main diﬀerence between these reaction function and the standard reaction
functions is that with inequity aversion there is a range of an opponent’s output
levels for which the best response of a ﬁrm is to produce the same quantity as
the opponent. That happens around the Cournot-Nash equilibrium quantity of
the standard simultaneous-move game. In other words, the best response has a
positive slope for output levels of the opponent close to the Cournot-Nash level
and a negative slope for the remaining output levels of the opponent. As we
have seen, Huck et al.’s (2002) experiment on Hamilton and Slutsky’s action
commitment game ﬁnd evidence for this type of reaction function.
Santos-Pinto (2006) also shows that the set of Nash equilibria of the single-





: q1 = q2, and N(β1,β2) ≤ qi ≤ N(α1,α2),i =1 ,2
ª
,
where N(β1,β2)=m a x[ q(β1),q(β2)], and N(α1,α2)=m i n[ q(α1),q(α2)].
This result tells us that inequity aversion between ﬁrms gives rise to a con-
tinuum of symmetric equilibria in the single-period Cournot duopoly game. The
intuition for this result is as follows. Suppose that a ﬁrm knows it’s opponent
will produce an output level that is close to the Nash equilibrium of the stan-
dard single-period Cournot game. If that ﬁrm dislikes inequity aversion, then
19The assumption that βi is smaller than 1/2 implies that a ﬁrm never cares more about the
proﬁt of her opponent than about her own proﬁt. This assumption also rules out equilibria of
the single period Cournot model where ﬁrms produce less than the collusive quantities.
13there is a cost in advantageous inequity associated with producing a higher level
of output than the opponent. Similarly, there is also a cost in disadvantageous
inequity associated with producing a smaller output level than the opponent.
For a range of output levels close to the Nash equilibrium of the standard single-
period Cournot game the proﬁts lost from not matching the opponent’s output
are small while the inequity costs are large. If that is the case then the ﬁrm is
better oﬀ by producing the same level of output as the opponent.
The result also shows that the smallest Nash equilibria of the single-period
Cournot game is determined by the lowest level of compassion of the two ﬁrms
and that the largest Nash equilibria is determined by the lowest level of envy
of the two ﬁrms. We see from (2) that if both ﬁrms have a level of compassion
equal to 1/2, then the lowest Nash equilibrium of the single-period Cournot
duopoly game with inequity averse ﬁrms corresponds to the collusive outcome.
We will now show that inequity aversion between ﬁrms also gives rise to
a continuum of symmetric equilibria in Saloner’s two-period Cournot duopoly
game. We start our analysis by stating a lemma that characterizes a ﬁrm’s
second-period equilibrium output in Saloner’s game with inequity averse ﬁrms.
Saloner (1987) proved this lemma in the standard two-period Cournot duopoly
game with selﬁsh ﬁrms. To prove our lemma we assume, without loss of gen-
erality, that there is symmetry in the inequity aversion parameters, that is, we
take α1 = α2 = α and β1 = β2 = β.20 Given this assumption, we let N(β)
denote N(β1,β2) and N(α) denote N(α1,α2). We are now ready to state the
lemma.
Lemma 1 Given the ﬁrst-period outputs (q1
1,q2
1), the second-period equilibrium
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where ti is given by (3).






lies on or outside the outer-envelope of t1(q2)







inside the outer-envelope of t1(q2) and t2(q1), then there are three cases to be
considered. If both ﬁrms have produced less than N(β) in the ﬁrst period, then





1 is more than N(β) but less than N(α), and ﬁrm i has produced less than q
j
1,
then ﬁrm i produces it’s best response to ﬁrm j’s ﬁrst period output and ﬁrm
j does not produce at all. In this case, both ﬁrms end up producing the same
20If we assume that β1 6= β2 and/or α1 6= α2 the game becomes asymmetric and ﬁrms’
second period equilibrium outputs are slightly more complicated to obtain. However, this has
no implications on the analysis that follows.
14amount since inequity aversion implies that ﬁrm i’s best response to ﬁrm j’s
ﬁrst period output is to produce as much as ﬁrm j.I f o n e ﬁrm has exceeded
N(α) but the other has not, then the latter produces it’s best response to the
former’s ﬁrst period output and the former does not produce at all. In this
case, the ﬁrm that has exceeded N(α) produces more than the ﬁrm that has
not exceeded N(α).
By comparing (1) to (6) we can see that inequity aversion between ﬁrms
changes the second-period equilibrium outputs in two ways. First, there is
a range of ﬁrst-period output levels for which the best response of a ﬁrm is
to produce the same level of output as the opponent. This happens because
producing the same level of output as the opponent implies a ﬁrst order gain in
reduction of inequity costs and a second order loss in material payoﬀ.S e c o n d ,
there is another range of ﬁrst period outputs for which the best response of a
ﬁrm is shifted by comparison with the best response in the absence of inequity
aversion. This happens because, for this other range of ﬁrst period output levels,
the ﬁrm that produces the smallest output level in the ﬁrst production end ups
feeling envy towards the opponent. This implies that the second-period output
of the ﬁrm that feels envy is larger than the output it would have produced in
the second period if it felt no envy.
We will use lemma 1 to characterize the set of equilibria of Saloner’s game
with inequity averse ﬁrms. Before doing that we need to introduce some nota-
tion. Let the Stackelberg leader’s quantity in the presence of inequity aversion
be denoted by Si(α,β),i=1 ,2 and the Stackelberg follower’s quantity by
Rj(Si(α,β)),j6= i. If ﬁrm i is the Stackelberg leader, then it picks the point
in Rj(qi) that maximizes its payoﬀ. The existence of inequity aversion implies
that the Stackelberg leader’s quantity is deﬁned as
Si(α,β)=
½
N(β), if Ui(Li(α,β),t j(Li(α,β))) ≤ Ui(N(β),N(β))
Li(α,β), otherwise ,
(7)





























j 6= i =1 ,2. We see from (7) and (8) that the presence of inequity aversion im-
plies that the Stackelberg point is either point (N(β),N(β)), the smallest Nash






If the payoﬀ of the smallest Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous move game is





, then point (N(β),N(β))
15is the Stackelberg point. If the payoﬀ of the smallest Nash equilibrium of the si-











is the Stackelberg point. In this case, ﬁrm
i produces more than ﬁrm j since Li(α,β) <t j ¡
Li(α,β)
¢
. This implies that
the material payoﬀ of ﬁrm i is larger than the material payoﬀ of ﬁrm j and
therefore ﬁrm i feels compassion towards ﬁrm j whereas ﬁrm j feels envy to-




, then it a function of α and of β. An increase in envy
reduces Li(α,β) and so does an increase in compassion. I ft h ed e g r e eo fe n v y
increases, this leads the follower to raise production and this in turn implies a
lower quantity for the leader. Also, if the degree of compassion of the leader
increases, then the leader reduces its output to reduce inequity aversion.
Proposition 1 characterizes the set of equilibria of Saloner’s game for rela-
tively high levels of inequity aversion between ﬁrms.
Proposition 1 If Ui(N(β),N(β)) >U i(Si(α,β),t j(Si(α,β))), i =1 ,2,t h e n





: q1 = q2,and N(β) ≤ qi ≤ N(α),i =1 ,2
ª
.
This result tells us that if the degree of inequity aversion between ﬁrms
is relatively high, then Saloner’s game has a continuum of symmetric SPNE.
The set of equilibria is any pair of total outputs where ﬁrms produce the same




2, and where the quantities produced by the two
ﬁrms are between the smallest and the largest Nash equilibrium of the single-
period Cournot duopoly game with inequity averse ﬁrms. Thus, if the degree
of inequity aversion between ﬁrms is relatively high, then the set of SPNE of
Saloner’s game coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the single-period
Cournot duopoly game.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Inequity aversion between
ﬁrms, no matter if it is high or low, gives rise to a continuum of symmetric
equilibria both in the single-period Cournot game as well as in Saloner’s duopoly
game. Inequity aversion between ﬁrms makes symmetric outcomes in the set
EIA
S more desirable to ﬁrms than unilateral deviations to asymmetric outcomes.
This happens because any unilateral deviation away from a symmetric outcome
in EIA
S with N ≤ qi ≤ N(α),i=1 ,2, leads to an inequity cost and a loss in
material payoﬀ and any unilateral deviation from a symmetric outcome in EIA
S
with N(β) ≤ qi ≤ N, i =1 ,2, leads to a ﬁrst order inequity cost and a second
order gain in material payoﬀ.
Relatively high levels of inequity aversion rule out asymmetric equilibria. If
α and β are such that the leader’s payoﬀ in the asymmetric Stackelberg point
is strictly smaller than the payoﬀ in the smallest Nash equilibrium of the single-
period Cournot duopoly game, then the asymmetric Stackelberg point is not
an equilibrium of Saloner’s game. If that is the case, then there is no other
asymmetric equilibria since the payoﬀ of the ﬁrm that produces more in any
asymmetric outcome is always smaller than its Stackelberg leader’s payoﬀ.I n
short, relatively high levels of inequity aversion increase the inequity costs of
16choosing a ﬁrst period production that leads to asymmetric quantities and so
the game has no asymmetric equilibria.21
Our next result characterizes the set of equilibria of Saloner’s game for rel-
atively low levels of inequity aversion between ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 If α and β are such that the Stackelberg point exists and
Ui(Si(α,β),R j(Si(α,β))) >U i(N(β),N(β)), i =1 ,2, then the set of equilibria
























where ˆ q(α,β) is the solution to Ui(N(β),N(β)) = Ui(qi,t j(qi)).
This result tells us that if the degree of inequity aversion between ﬁrms is rel-
atively low, then Saloner’s game has a continuum of symmetric and asymmetric
SPNE. Like in Proposition 1, the set of equilibria is any pair of total outputs
where ﬁrms produce the same quantity and where the quantities produced by
the two ﬁrms are between the smallest and the largest Nash equilibrium of si-
multaneous move game. Additionally, the set of equilibria is also composed of
any point on the outer envelope of the reaction function of ﬁrm i between ﬁrm
i’s Stackelberg leader’s output and output level ˆ q(α,β),i=1 ,2.
This result is not surprising. If the level of inequity aversion is relatively low,
then unilateral deviations from asymmetric outcomes to symmetric outcomes
may no longer be desirable. This happens because as inequity aversion decreases
the gains in inequity costs from playing symmetric outcomes become smaller
than the losses in material payoﬀs. If that is the case there must be suﬃciently
low levels of inequity aversion for which Saloner’s game has asymmetric equilib-
ria. Proposition 2 states the conditions for this to happen and characterizes the
set of asymmetric equilibria. It tells us that if α and β are relatively low, then
21To characterize the condition that deﬁnes what we call relatively high levels of in-
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4(1− β)(1+2α)(2+2α − 3β − 2βα) ≥ (3 − 2β)2 (1 + α − β)2 .
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.
We see that if β =0 , then the minimum degree of envy that satisﬁes the inequality is α =1 /7.
If α =0 , then the minimum degree of compassion that satisﬁes the inequality is β =0 .14922.





. This point is an equi-
librium of the two-period game since the condition Ui(Si(α,β),t j(Si(α,β))) ≥
Ui(N(β),N(β)) implies that the Stackelberg leader does not wish to deviate
from the Stackelberg quantity to N(β), the best symmetric equilibrium quan-
tity. It also follows that there is a set of points on tj(·) such that ˆ q(α,β) <q i <
Li(α,β) which are also asymmetric equilibria since the payoﬀ at these points
is larger than the payoﬀ of the smallest Nash equilibrium of the simultaneous
move game.
Santos-Pinto (2006) shows that the point (N(β),N(β)) is decreasing with β,
that is, the smallest symmetric equilibrium of the single-period Cournot duopoly
game with inequity averse ﬁrms is decreasing with an increase in compassion.
This means, that an decrease in compassion moves the set of symmetric equi-
librium outcomes closer to the collusive outcome (the outcome obtained when
β =1 /2). By contrast, the largest symmetric equilibrium of the single-period
Cournot duopoly game with inequity averse ﬁrms is increasing with an increase
in envy.
Obviously, these results also apply to the set of symmetric equilibria of
Saloner’s game with inequity averse ﬁrms. As α and β converge to zero the
impact of inequity aversion vanishes. As the impact of inequity aversion vanishes
the set of symmetric equilibria in Saloner’s game with inequity aversion collapses
to the Nash equilibria of the single-period Cournot game.22 By contrast, as the
impact of inequity aversion vanishes the set of asymmetric equilibria in Saloner’s
game with inequity aversion expands.23
Let us now consider the impact of inequity aversion on the set of equilibria in
Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game. The next result characterizes
the set of equilibria of this game for relatively high levels of inequity aversion.
Proposition 3 If Ui(N(β),N(β)) >U i(Si(α,β),t j(Si(α,β))), i =1 ,2, then
the set of equilibria of Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game with










1,and N(β) ≤ qi











This result tells us that if the degree of inequity aversion between ﬁrms
is relatively high, then Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game has
a continuum of symmetric SPNE. The set of equilibria is any pair of outputs
where ﬁrms produce the same quantity, they do it in the ﬁrst production period,
and where the quantities produced by the two ﬁrms are between the smallest
and the largest Nash equilibrium of the single-period Cournot duopoly game
with inequity averse ﬁrms. Thus, if the degree of inequity aversion between
ﬁrms is relatively high, then the set of SPNE of Hamilton and Slutsky’s action
22As α converges to zero the point (N(α),N(α)) converges to (N,N) and as β converges to
zero the point (N(β),N(β)) converges to (N,N).









i =1 ,2..As α and β converge to zero the point
¡
ˆ q(α,β),t j(ˆ q(α,β))
¢
converges to (N,N).
18commitment game coincides with the set of Nash equilibria of the single-period
Cournot duopoly game.24
The intuition for this result is as follows. Inequity aversion between ﬁrms, no
matter if it is high or low, gives rise to a continuum of symmetric equilibria both
in the single-period Cournot game as well as in Hamilton and Slutsky’s game.
Additionally, if inequity aversion is relatively high, that is, α and β are such that
each ﬁrm prefers the smallest Nash equilibrium payoﬀ of the simultaneous move
game, Ui(N(β),N(β)) to its payoﬀ as the Stackelberg leader, then there are
no Stackelberg equilibria. Thus, the only equilibria of Hamilton and Slutsky’s
action commitment game with relatively high levels of inequity aversion between
ﬁrms are the simultaneous-move equilibria. The fact that in Hamilton and
Slutsky’s action commitment game ﬁrms can only produce in one of the two
periods implies that production in any simultaneous move-equilibria takes place
in the ﬁrst period.
The fact that there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria and that
ﬁrms must coordinate by moving simultaneously in the ﬁrst production period
is consistent with the empirical ﬁnding that there is more coordination failure
in Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game than in Saloner’s game.
The next result characterizes the set of equilibria in Hamilton and Slutsky’s
action commitment game for relatively low levels of inequity aversion.
Proposition 4 If α and β are such that the Stackelberg point exists and
Ui(Si(α,β),R j(Si(α,β))) >U i(N(β),N(β)), i =1 ,2, then the set of equilibria
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This result tells us that if the degree of inequity aversion between ﬁrms
is relatively low, then Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game has a
continuum of symmetric SPNE and two asymmetric SPNE. In any symmet-
ric equilibria both ﬁrms produce in the ﬁrst period and each ﬁrm produces a
quantity between the smallest and the largest Nash equilibrium quantity of the
single-period Cournot duopoly game with inequity averse ﬁrms. The asym-
metric equilibria are of the leader follower type with one ﬁrm producing the
Stackelberg leader’s quantity in the ﬁrst production period and the other ﬁrm
producing the Stackelberg follower’s quantity in the second period. The dif-
ference here, by comparison with Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment
game with selﬁsh ﬁrms, is that a compassionate leader produces less than a
selﬁsh leader and a envious follower produces more than a selﬁsh follower.
24This is true for any symmetric equilibria in EIA
HS, except the lowest Nash equilibrium of
the simultanous-move Cournot game, (N(β),N(β)). Suppose that both ﬁrms produce N(β)
in the second production period. In this case ,each ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between producing N(β)
i nt h es e c o n dp r o d u c t i o np e r i o do ri nt h eﬁrst.
195 Summary and Comparison
In this section we summarize the predictions of the inequity aversion explanation
for Saloner’s game and for Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game.
We also compare the predictions to the experimental evidence. Table V below
summarizes the predictions for Saloner’s game.
Table V
Saloner’s Duopoly Game
Sym. Asym Coll. Stack. Time Balance Prod.
eq. eq. out. warf. prod. shares P1
Ineq. Av.
High Many - Yes Yes P1&P2 Yes No
Low Many - No No P1&P2 Yes No
-M a n y - -P 1 &P2 - No
Recall that the experimental evidence on Saloner’s game tells us that: (i)
Stackelberg outcomes are extremely rare, (ii) simultaneous-move symmetric out-
comes are the most frequent outcomes, (iii) sometimes collusive outcomes are
observed, (iv) there is production in both periods with 84% of production taking
place in the ﬁrst period, (v) subjects seem to attempt to balance market shares
in the second production period, and (vi) subjects do not produce more than
the Stackelberg follower’s quantity in the ﬁrst production period.
Table V shows us that the predictions of the inequity aversion explanation
are consistent with most of the experimental evidence on Saloner’s game. First,
relatively high levels of inequity aversion imply that Saloner’s game has a con-
tinuum of simultaneous-move symmetric equilibria. Among all the symmetric
equilibria the Cournot-Nash equilibrium may be the one that is more frequently
played because it is always a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game
no matter if there is inequity aversion or not. This is no longer true for other
symmetric equilibria. When inequity aversion is low there is still a continuum
of simultaneous-move symmetric equilibria but there is also a continuum of
asymmetric equilibria where play may be sequential.
Second, inequity aversion is also able to explain the fact that in some games
“collusive outcomes” are played. This can happen whenever two subjects with
a high degree of compassion are matched to play the game and are able to
coordinate on the collusive outcome. Similarly, inequity aversion is also able
to explain the fact that in some games there is Stackelberg warfare. This can
happen whenever two subjects with a high degree of envy are matched to play
the game and both produce more than the Cournot-Nash quantities.
Third, relatively high levels of inequity aversion rule out Stackelberg out-
comes. However, relatively low levels of inequity aversion do not. Thus, when-
ever two subjects with a relatively low level of inequity aversion are matched to
play the game we may have Stackelberg equilibria.
Fourth, inequity aversion is also able to explain the fact that subjects in
experiments produce in both periods. This happens because inequity aversion
20gives rise to a multiplicity of symmetric equilibria in the game and subjects have
to coordinate on one of them. If subjects are unable to coordinate in one of the
multiple symmetric equilibria in the ﬁrst production period, then they have an
incentive to produce in the second production period to attain coordination
before the market clears.
Fifth, inequity aversion also predicts that subjects attempt to balance mar-
ket shares. This happens whenever subjects fail to coordinate on a symmetric
equilibrium in the ﬁrst production period. In those cases, the subject who pro-
duced less in the ﬁrst production period will produce a positive amount in the
second period whereas the subject who produced more in the ﬁrst production
period will not produce in the second production period.
The only empirical ﬁnding in Saloner’s game that the inequity aversion ex-
planation seems unable to account for is the fact that ﬁrms do not produce more
than the Stackelberg follower’s quantity in the ﬁrst production period.
Table VI below summarizes the predictions for Hamilton and Slutsky’s action
commitment game.
Table VI
Hamilton and Slutsky’s Action Commitment Game
Sym. Stack. Coll. Stack. Punish Time Cournot
eq. eq. out. warf. leader prod. in P2
Ineq. Av.
High Many - Yes Yes - P1 No
Low Many - No No - P1 No
-T w o - - Y e s P 1 &P2 -
Recall that the experimental evidence on Hamilton and Slutsky’s action com-
mitment game tells us that: (i) Stackelberg outcomes are rare, (ii) simultaneous-
move Cournot outcomes are the most frequent outcomes, (iii) simultaneous-
move outcomes are often played in the second production period, and (iv) be-
havior is quite heterogeneous—in some cases followers punish leaders, in other
cases collusive outcomes are played, and in other cases Stackelberg warfare is
observed.
Table VI shows us that inequity aversion is also able to explain most of the
experimental evidence on Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game.
First, relatively high levels of inequity aversion imply that Hamilton and Slut-
sky’s action commitment game only has simultaneous-move symmetric outcomes
where both ﬁrms produce in the ﬁrst production period.25 When inequity aver-
sion is low there is a continuum of simultaneous-move symmetric equilibria but
there are also two Stackelberg equilibria with sequential play.
25Like in Saloner’s game with inequity averse ﬁrms, among all the symmetric equilibria in
Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game with inequity averse ﬁrms, the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium may be the one that is more fequently played. This happens because this
equilibrium is always a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game no matter if there is
inequity aversion or not. That is no longer the case with other symmetric equilibria.
21Second, inequity aversion can explain collusive outcomes in Hamilton and
Slutsky’s action commitment game. This happens whenever both players have
a relatively high level of inequity aversion and they are able to coordinate on
the collusive outcome.
Third, if inequity aversion is relatively high there are no Stackelberg out-
comes in Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game. So, for Stackelberg
outcomes to be played players must have relatively low levels of inequity aver-
sion.
Fourth, if inequity aversion is relatively low and players play the Stackelberg
outcome, then the model predicts that the Stackelberg leader will feel compas-
sion towards the follower and that the Stackelberg follower will feel envy towards
the leader. This implies that a compassionate leader produces less than a selﬁsh
leader and that an envious follower produces more than a selﬁsh follower. This
pattern is consistent with the evidence in Huck et al. (2002). Table III shows
that in the experiment with the large payoﬀ matrix, explicit followers produce
on average 8.93 units. This is signiﬁcantly higher than the Stackelberg follower’s
quantity of 6 units.26
The only empirical ﬁnding in Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment
game that inequity aversion is unable to explain is simultaneous-move Cournot-
Nash outcomes in the second production period.27
6E x t e n s i o n s
As we have seen, Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) model of inequity aversion is able
to explain several experimental ﬁndings in endogenous timing games. However,
Fehr and Schmidt’s speciﬁcation is a particular functional form of inequity aver-
sion (it is piecewise linear and non-diﬀerentiable). Could it be that the results
obtained extend to more general preferences?
26The same happens in the experiment with the small payoﬀ matrix. On average, explicit
followers in the experiment with the small payoﬀ matrix produce 7.89. Huck et al. (2002) do
not display data for explicit leaders. However, we can use the data in the small payoﬀ matrix
to have an idea of the average quantity of explicit leaders (in the small payoﬀ matrix most
players who produce in the ﬁrst period are explicit leaders, this is not the case in the large
payoﬀ matrix). In the experiment with the small payoﬀ matrix there are 136 players who
produce in the ﬁrst period, of which 94 are explicit leaders and 42 are players who produce
simultaneously. If the 94 explicit leaders produced the leader’s quantity, 12 units, and the
other 42 players the Cournot-Nash quantity, the average output of these 136 players should
be equal to 10.76. By contrast, the data shows that the average output of these 136 players
is signiﬁcantly lower: 8.65 units. This tells us that, on average, explicit leaders produce
substantially less than the Stackelberg quantity.
27Fonseca et al. (2005b) test experimentally Hamilton and Slutsky (1990)’ s observable
delay game. In this game two ﬁrms bindingly announce a production period (one out of
two periods) and then produce in the announced sequence. Hamilton and Slutsky show that
this game has a unique symmetric equilibrium where ﬁrms produce only in the ﬁrst period.
Fonseca et al. (2005b) ﬁnd that there is delay in players’ production decisions. The ﬁndings
in this paper show that inequity aversion is also not able to explain delay in Fonseca et al.
(2005b).
22Santos-Pinto (2006) studies the impact of general forms of inequity aver-
sion on Cournot competition. He shows that for diﬀerentiable forms of inequity
aversion the best reply of a ﬁrm is always negatively sloped. However, the
best reply of an inequity averse ﬁrm is smaller than the best reply of a self-
ish ﬁrm when the rival produces low output levels (the inequity averse ﬁrms
fells compassion for the rival) and the best reply of an inequity averse ﬁrm is
larger than that of a selﬁsh ﬁrm when the rival produces high output levels
(the inequity averse ﬁrm feels envy towards the rival). This implies that the
set of SPNE of Saloner’s game with diﬀerentiable inequity aversion is closer to
the 45odegree line, than the set of SPNE of Saloner’s game with selﬁsh ﬁrms.
The same happens in Hamilton and Slutsky’s (1990) endogenous timing game.
The Stackelberg equilibria of Hamilton and Slutsky’s action commitment game
with ﬁrms with diﬀerentiable inequity aversion are much less asymmetric than
the Stackelberg equilibria obtained with selﬁsh ﬁrms. Thus, inequity aversion
either rules out asymmetric outcomes completely (high levels of piecewise linear
inequity aversion) or reduces the degree of asymmetry substantially (high levels
of diﬀerentiable inequity aversion).
The fact that diﬀerentiable inequity aversion does not lead to positively
sloped best replies for intermediate output levels of the rival implies that the
continuum of equilibria result obtained with piecewise linear aversion is no longer
v a l i d . T h i si nt u r ni m p l i e st h a td i ﬀerentiable inequity aversion can no longer
explain production in both periods in Saloner’s game as well as the ﬁnding that
players try to balance market shares in the second production period.
Besides inequity aversion, reciprocity, is another common type of other-
regarding preferences. A reciprocal agent cares about the intentions of his rivals.
He responds to actions that he perceives to be harmful in a harmful manner and
he responds to actions that he perceives to be kind in a kind manner. Santos-
Pinto (2006) shows that the impact of reciprocity on Cournot competition is
similar to that of inequity aversion. Thus, the results in this paper also extend
to players with reciprocal preferences.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The prediction of asymmetric equilibria with Stackelberg outcomes is clearly the
most frequent result in the endogenous timing literature. Several experiments
have tried to validate this prediction empirically, but failed to ﬁnd support for it.
By contrast, the experiments ﬁnd that simultaneous-move outcomes are modal.
Additionally, the experiments ﬁnd that behavior in endogenous timing games is
quite heterogeneous. In many cases we have simultaneous-move play, sometimes
collusive outcomes are observed, other times there is Stackelberg warfare, and
there can be also sequential play with Stackelberg like outcomes, among others.
T h eg a pb e t w e e nt h et h e o r ya n dt h ee x p e r i m e n t a le v i d e n c ew a st h em a i n
motivation behind this paper. To bridge that gap the paper formalizes the impli-
cations of inequity aversion in Saloner’s and Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous
timing games. The paper shows that inequity aversion is able to organize most
23of the experimental evidence on endogenous timing games.
We ﬁnd that relatively high levels of inequity aversion rule out asymmetric
equilibria in endogenous timing games. We also ﬁnd that inequity aversion gives
rise to a continuum of simultaneous-move equilibria. These equilibria include
the Cournot-Nash outcome, collusive outcomes as well as Stackelberg warfare.
Thus, inequity aversion is able to explain the wide diversity of behavior observed
in experimental endogenous timing games. Inequity aversion is also able to
explain why subjects produce in both production periods in Saloner’s game.
This happens whenever individuals fail to coordinate on one of the symmetric
equilibria in the ﬁrst production period. However, inequity aversion is not able
to explain delay in Hamilton and Slutsky’s endogenous timing games. Inequity
aversion is also not able to explain the fact that ﬁrms do not produce more than
the Stackelberg follower’s output in the ﬁrst production period in Saloner’s
game.
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258A p p e n d i x
Proof of Proposition 1:W e ﬁr s ts h o wt h a ta n yp o i n ti nEIA
S can be attained
as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. To do that we will show that the
following strategies for each ﬁrm constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium:
qi
1 = ai, where
¡
a1,a 2¢
is a point in EIA
S and qi
2 is given by (6). Lemma 1 shows
that the strategies in the second production period are equilibrium strategies.
Let us then consider the ﬁrst production period. Since the game is symmetric we
can focus on a single ﬁrm. So, without loss of generality, consider ﬁrm 1. If ﬁrm
1 follows the prescribed strategy it’s payoﬀ is given by U1(a1,a 2)=π1(a1,a 2).
It is obvious that ﬁrm 1 can not gain by producing less than it’s prescribed ﬁrst
period strategy. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates from it’s ﬁrst period strategy and
produces q1
1 = a1 + ε, with 0 < ε ≤ N(α) − a1. If that is the case, then ﬁrm
1 will not produce in the second period but ﬁrm 2 will produce q2
2 = ε. So,
the total output of each ﬁrm becomes qi = ai + ε,i=1 ,2. This implies that
ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ under the deviation is given by π1(a1 + ε,a 2 + ε). If βi ≤ 1/2,
i =1 ,2, and 0 < ε ≤ N(α) − a1, then π1(a1 + ε,a 2 + ε) < π1(a1,a 2) since
ﬁrms are moving away from the collusive quantities. Thus, ﬁrm 1 is worse oﬀ
by producing q1
1 = a1 +ε, with 0 < ε ≤ N(α)−a1, rather that producing what
it’s prescribed ﬁrst period strategy dictates. Now, suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates
from it’s ﬁrst period strategy and produces q1
1 = a1 + ε, with N(α) − a1 < ε ≤
(t2)−1(a2) − a1. If that is the case, then ﬁrm 1 will not produce in the second
period and ﬁrm 2 will produce q2
2 = t2(q1
1)−a1. T h u s ,w eh a v et h a tq1 = a1 +ε
and q2 = t2(a1 + ε), with N(α) − a1 < ε ≤ (t2)−1(a2) − a1. The payoﬀ of ﬁrm
1 becomes U1 ¡
a1 + ε,t 2(a1 + ε)
¢
. We know that
U1 ¡
a1 + ε,t 2(a1 + ε)
¢
<U 1 ¡
t2(a1 + ε),t 2(a1 + ε)
¢
.
We also know that
U1 ¡
t2(a1 + ε),t 2(a1 + ε)
¢
<U 1(a1,a 2).
These two inequalities imply that
U1 ¡
a1 + ε,t 2(a1 + ε)
¢
<U 1(a1,a 2),
that is, ﬁrm 1 can not gain with the deviation.
It remains to show that there is no other subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.








lie outside the outer envelope of t2(·) and t1(·). If
¡
b1,b 2¢
lies outside the outer
envelope of t2(·) and t1(·) and qi
2 > 0 for either ﬁrm, then the ﬁrm with a posi-
tive production in the second period would do better by unilaterally decreasing
production in that period. If
¡
b1,b 2¢
lies outside the outer envelope of t2(·)
and t1(·) and qi
2 =0 ,i=1 ,2, then either ﬁrm would do better by unilaterally
decreasing production in the ﬁrst period. If
¡
b1,b 2¢
is such that b1 >N (α)
and b2 is inside the outer envelope of t2(·), then ﬁrm 2 would do better by




26b1 is inside the outer envelope of t1(·) and b2 >N (α), then ﬁrm 1 would do




b2 <b 1 and N(β) <b 1 <N (α), then ﬁrm 2 would do better by producing
b2 − b1 in the second period. Similarly, if
¡
b1,b 2¢
is such that b1 <b 2 and




is such that b1 <N (β) and b2 is inside the outer
envelope of s2(·), then ﬁrm 2 would do better by producing s2(b1) − b2 in the
second period. Similarly, if
¡
b1,b 2¢
is such that b1 is inside the outer envelope
of s1(·) and b2 <N (β), then ﬁrm 1 would do better by producing s1(b2) − b1
in the second period. That leaves points
¡
b1,b 2¢






















t2¢−1 (N(β)) <b 1. The fact
that
¡
t2¢−1 (N(β)) <b 1 implies that b2 <N(β). But then, the assumption that
U1(S1(α,β),R 2(S1(α,β))) ≤ U1(N(β),N(β)),
implies




is not an equilibrium since ﬁrm 1 is better oﬀ by playing q1
1 =
N(β) instead of playing any b1 on t2(·) with
¡
t2¢−1 (N(β)) <b 1. Since the





t1¢−1 (N(β)) <b 2. Q.E.D.

























Clearly, the method of proof used in Proposition 1 can be applied here to show
that any point in EIA
S0 can be attained as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
So, let us show that any point in EIA
Si ,i=1 ,2, is also a subgame perfect
equilibrium. To do that we will show that the following strategies for each ﬁrm
constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium: qi






2 is given by (6). Lemma 1 shows that the strategies in
the second production period are equilibrium strategies. Let us then consider
the ﬁrst production period. Since the game is symmetric we can focus on a
27single ﬁrm. So, without loss of generality, consider ﬁrm 1. If ﬁrm 1 follows the
prescribed strategy it’s payoﬀ is given by
U1(a1,t 2(a1)) = (1 − β)π1(a1,t 2(a1)) + βπ2(t2(a1),a 1).
It is obvious that ﬁrm 1 can not gain by producing more than it’s prescribed
ﬁrst period strategy. Suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates from it’s ﬁrst period strategy
and produces q1
1 = a1 −ε, with 0 < ε ≤ a1 −N(α). If that is the case, then ﬁrm
1 will not produce in the second period but ﬁrm 2 will produce q2
2 = t2(q1
1)−a2.
So, the total output of ﬁrm 1 is q1 = a1 − ε and the total output of ﬁrm
2i sq2 = t2(a1 − ε), with 0 < ε ≤ a1 − N(α). This implies that ﬁrm 1’s









,U 1(q1,t 2(q1)) attains
its maximum. Since U1(a1 −ε,t 2(a1 −ε)) is further away from the Stackelberg
point than U1(a1,t 2(a1)), it follows that
U1(a1 − ε,t 2(a1 − ε)) <U 1(a1,t 2(a1)),






1 . Now, suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates from it’s ﬁrst
period strategy and produces q1
1 = a1 − ε, with a1 − N(α) < ε ≤ a1 − N(β). If
that is the case, then ﬁrm 1 will not produce in the second period but ﬁrm 2
will produce q2
2 = q1
1 − a2. So, the total output of ﬁrm 1 is q1 = a1 − ε and the
total output of ﬁrm 2 is q2 = a1 − ε, with a1 − N(α) < ε ≤ a1 − N(β). This
implies that ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ under the deviation is given by U1(a1 − ε,a 1 − ε).
We have that
U1(N(α),N(α)) ≤ U1(a1 − ε,a 1 − ε) ≤ U1(N(β),N(β)).
The assumption
U1(N(β),N(β)) = U1 ¡




U1(a1 − ε,a 1 − ε) ≤ U1(N(β),N(β))
= U1 ¡












1 . Finally, suppose that ﬁrm 1 deviates from
it’s ﬁrst period strategy and produces q1
1 = a1 − ε, with a1 − N(β) < ε ≤ a1. If
that is the case, then ﬁrm 1 will produce q1
2 = N(β)−q1
1 in period 2 and ﬁrm 2
will produce q2
2 = N(β)−q2
1. So, the total output of both ﬁrms will be N(β) and
this implies that ﬁrm 1’s payoﬀ under the deviation is given by U1(N(β),N(β)).
The assumption that
U1(N(β),N(β)) = U1 ¡




U1(a1 − ε,a 1 − ε)=U1(N(β),N(β))
= U1 ¡













It remains to show that there is no other subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. The
method of proof used in Proposition 1 can be applied here to show that there is
no other subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outside or inside the outer envelope
of t2(·) and t1(·).T h a tl e a v e sp o i n t s
¡
b1,b 2¢
on t2(·) such that (t2)−1(N(β)) <
b1 < ˆ q(α,β) and points
¡
b1,b 2¢
on t2(·) such that L(α,β) <b 1. By deﬁnition
we have that U1 ¡
ˆ q(α,β),t 2(ˆ q(α,β))
¢







on t2(·) such that (t2)−1(N(β)) <b 1 < ˆ q(α,β). However, since ﬁrm
2i sp r o d u c i n gq2
1 <N(β), ﬁrm 1 can do better by producing q1
1 = N(β). In this
case ﬁrm 1 would produce q1
2 =0and ﬁrm 2 would produce q2
2 = N(β)−q2
1. This






on t2(·) such that (t2)−1(N(β)) <b 1 < ˆ q(α,β). Points ¡
b1,b 2¢
on t2(·) such that L(α,β) <b 1 are also not an equilibrium because ﬁrm
1 can do better by producing q1
1 = L(α,β). Since the game is symmetric, the
same arguments apply for points
¡
b1,b 2¢
on t1(·) such that (t1)−1(N(β)) <b 2 <
ˆ q(α,β) and points
¡
b1,b 2¢
on t1(·) such that L(α,β) <b 2. Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 :L e t
¡
a1,a 2¢
be any point in EIA
HS. Since a2 is a best
reply to a1, neither waiting nor any other output choice in the ﬁrst production





is an equilibrium. No other outcome can be a subgame perfect equilibrium.




in the second production period. This is not an equilibrium
since the assumption that U1(N(β),N(β)) >U 1(L1(α,β),t 2(L1(α,β))) implies
that 1 can do better by producing N(β) in the ﬁrst production period. Similarly,




the second production period is not an equilibrium. A situation where 1 and
2p l a y
¡
b1,b 2¢




HS is not an
equilibrium since at least one of the ﬁrms is not playing her best reply to the
other ﬁrm. If 1 waits, the only possible equilibrium action is 2 playing N(β),
and similarly if 2 waits. Q.E.D.
















1,and N(β) ≤ qi


















be any point in EIA
HS0. Since a2 is a best reply to a1, neither waiting
nor any other output choice in the ﬁrst production period can raise 2’s pay-




HS0 is an equilibrium.
Now consider the situation where ﬁrm 1 plays L1(α,β) in the ﬁrst produc-
tion period and ﬁrm 2 waits and then plays t2(L1(α,β)) in the second produc-
tion period. This is equilibrium since the assumption that U1(N(β),N(β)) <
U1(L1(α,β),t 2(L1(α,β))) implies that 1 can not gain by deviating from L1(α,β)
in the ﬁrst production period. Similarly, 2 playing L2(α,β) in the ﬁrst pro-
d u c t i o np e r i o da n d1p l a y i n gt1 ¡
L2(α,β)
¢
in the second production period
is an equilibrium. No other outcome can be a subgame perfect equilibrium.
A situation where 1 and 2 play
¡
b1,b 2¢
in the ﬁrst production period with ¡
b1,b 2¢
/ ∈ EIA
HS0 is not an equilibrium since at least one of the ﬁrms is not play-
ing her best reply to the other ﬁrm. If 1 waits, the only possible equilibrium
action is 2 playing L2(α,β), and similarly if 2 waits. Q.E.D.
30